

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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DODE-00 EA-07 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10

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SAJ-01 ERDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 NRC-05

ACDE-00 /122 W

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O R 131845Z AUG 76

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1868

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

USMISSION NATO

ERDA HQ WASHDC

ERDA GERMANTOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 GENEVA 6536

DISTO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD, US, UR

SUBJECT: CCD - SCOPE OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS ON BW
AND CW

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF STATEMENTS
MADE DURING PERIOD AUGUST 6 THROUGH 12, 1976, ON SUBJECT OF
COVERAGE OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS ON BW,
CW AND ENMOD.

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2. WESTERN GROUP MEETING, AUG 6, REPORTED GENEVA 6408.

SEE APRAS 3, 6 AND 7. SUBSTANCE OF STATE 192338 PARA 3(E)
WAS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED. RELEVANT PORTION OF TEXT OF
PREPARED STATEMENT PRESENTED TO WENSTERN GROUP BY BUCHHEIM
(SEE AIRGRAM A-203) AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

FURHTER, I WISH TO MENTION A POINT TO WHICH THE
US GOVERNMENT ATTACHES CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE. SOME
OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION ALREADY PRESENTED BY SOVIET EXPERTS
SEEM RATHER CLEARLY TO FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF EXIST-
ING AGREEMENTS OR NEGOTIATIONS. IN OUR VIEW, IT WOULD
BE BETTER IF DISCUSSIONS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL NOT
INCLUDE TYPES OF WEAPONS ALREADY CONTEMPLATED BY EXIST-
ING AGREEMENTS OR NEGOTIATIONS.

END TEXT.

3. BILATERAL US/USSR MEETING AUG 9, REPORTED GENEVA
6437. SOVIETS HANDED OVER RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH TEXTS OF
PAPER TO BE PRESENTED AT CCD INFORMAL MEETINGS AND
ENGLISH TEXT TRANSMITTED IN FULL GENEVA 6413.

4. SOVIET PAPER INCLUDES FOLLOWING SENTENCE:

BEGIN TEXT.

NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INCLUDE
THE TYPES OF WEAPONS WHICH ARE BASED ON ENTIRELY NEW
PRINCIPLES OF ACTION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF WHICH CAN BE
COMPARABLE TO OR SURPASSING THAT OF TRADITIONAL TYPES OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

END TEXT.

5. ANNEX TO SOVIET PAPER INCLUDES FOLLOWING SENTENCE:

BEGIN TEXT.

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BELOW IS GIVEN THE LIST OF THE CLASSIFYING
FEATHURES INHERENT TO ANY TYPE OF WEAPON OF MASS
DESTRUCTION.

END TEXT.

6. COMMENT: THESE SENTENCES APPEAR TO BE PRECURSORS
TO, AND BASIS FOR, LATER SOVIET STATEMENTS THAT THEIR

DISCUSSIONS HAVE DEALTH WITH WEAPONS THAT ARE COVERED BY EXISTING AGREEMENTS OR NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL AS THOSE THAT ARE NOT.

7. BILATERAL US/USSR MEETING AUG 9 REPORTED GENEVA 6437, WHEREIN MARTIN REMARKED ON SUBJECT OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS REPORTED IN PARA 4.

8. INFORMAL MEETING AUG 9. EXPERT OF UNITED KINGDOM (DR. STRANGE) MADE PREPARED STATEMENT (SEE AIRGRAM 206) WHICH INCLUDED FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

WHILST THE SCIENTIFIC AND MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACCIDENTS IN CIVILIAN RESEARCH INTO GENETIC ENGINEERING ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO BE THE SUBJECT OF SOME CONTROVERSY, WE DO NOT SEE HOW GENETIC MANIPULATION COULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS PRODUCING A NEW WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION. HUMAN TINKERING IN THIS AREA WOULD ONLY ADD TO THE UNPLEASANT CAPABILITIES OF NATURALLY EXISTING ORGANISMS. MOREOVER, SUCH MANIPULATION WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION. IF THE PURPOSE OF PRODUCING A NEW STRAIN OF DISEASE OR INSECT PEST WAS TO DESTROY OR DAMAGE THE FOOD SUPPLIES AND NATURAL RESOURCES OF AN ENEMY STATE, THIS WOULD BE ALREADY PROHIBITED UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 48 OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 1, TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS, UNDER DISCUSSION AT THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE REAFFIRMATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT HERE IN GENEVA.

END TEXT.
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9. INFORMAL MEETING AUG 9. AMB. ALLEN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM MADE A PREPARED STATEMENT (SEE AIRGRAM 206) WHICH INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

MR. STRANGE HAS DEALTH WITH SOME OF THE PARTICULAR AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SUBJECT. HIS COMMENTS. . . RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DISCUSSIONS OF MDW AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS IN THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT FIELD. WE SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE VIEWS OF THE SOVIET, AND OF COURSE OTHER DELEGATIONS, ON THE FORM OF INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY WHICH MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR CONSIDERING THE QUESTION

OF NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. A NUMBER OF EXISTING
ARMS CONTROL TREATIES AND CURRENT SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS
ARE RELEVANT TO THIS QUESTION. FOR INSTANCE, IS IT
PROPOSED THAT DISCUSSION OF NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
SHOULD COVER ANY WEAPON ALREADY INCLUDED IN THE STRATEGIC
ARMS LIMITATION TALKS? THE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES MENTIONED
UNDER THE COLLECTIVE TERM "WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION"
ARE VERY VARIED; BUT IT IS NOT EARY TO ENVISAGE ANYTHING
WHICH COULD NOT FALL UNDER EITHER THE STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION TALKS OR THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVEN-
TION OR THE CONVENTION BANNING ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION
FOR HOSTILE PURPOSES, WHICH THE CCD IS NOW COMPLETING, OR
ANY CONVENTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WHICH MAY RESULT FROM
THE DRAFT WHCIH MY DELEGATION HOPES TO TABLE LATER THIS
WEEK. AND OF COURSE IT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER
PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS OR PROTOCOLS TO SUCH TREATIES IF
IN THEIR PRESENT FORM THEY SEEM INADEQUATE.

END TEXT.

10 INFORMAL MEETING AUG 9. EXPERTS FROM GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (DR. BOEHME) MADE PREPARED STATEMENT
(SEE AIRGRAM 211) WHICH INCLUDED FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

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WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CONTEMPORARY DISCUSSIONS
CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANU-
FACTURE OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND
OF NEW SYSTEMS OF SUCH WEAPONS FREQUENTLY REFERENCE IS
MADE TO SO-CALLED GENETIC WEAPONS.

GENETICS IS THE STUDY OF BIOLOGICAL INHERITANCE,
AND THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION IS IN WHAT WAY THIS SCIENCE
MAY CONTRIBUTE TO MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS.

END TEXT.

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ACTION ACDA-10

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ACDE-00 /122 W

----- 120570

O R 131845Z AUG 76

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1869

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

USMISSION NATO

ERDA HQ WASHDC

ERDA GERMANTOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 GENEVA 6536

DISTO

THEN, AFTER SOME GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE SCIENCE
AS SUCH, INCLUDING REFERENCE TO GENETIC ENGINEERING, THE
PAPER INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

ALTHOUGH I AM NOT AN EXPERT IN WEAPONS, BUT CONCERNED WITH THEORETICAL GENETICS, WOULD LIKE TO POINT TO THREE EXAMPLES WHICH ILLUSTRATE POTENTIAL MILITARY USES OF THE RESULTS OF GENETIC RESEARCH. IN DOING SO,
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I CONSCIOUSLY CONFINE MYSELF TO CASES WHICH, IN MY VIEW, DO NOT FALL UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR

DESTRUCTION.

1. WE HAVE TODAY THE THEORETICAL PREREQUISITES TO BIOCHEMICALLY OR CHEMICALLY SYNTHESIZE NUCLEO-PROTEIN COMPLEXES WITH THE PROPERTIES OF VIRUSES. A SYNTHETIC VIRUS OF THAT KIND MAY CAUSE EPIDEMIC DISEASES FOR WHICH NO THERARY EXISTS UP TO NOW OR WHICH ARE DIFFICULT TO CURE. IT IS EVEN CONCEIVABLE THAT A VIRUS-LIKE NUCLEO-PROTEIN COMPLEX MAY BE CONSTRUCTED WHICH CARRIES THE GENETIC INFORMATION FOR A NON-LETHAL CHARACTER WHICH IMPAIRS THE EFFICIENCY OF HUMAN BEINGS.

2. THE LIVING CELL IS, GENETICALLY DETERMINED, ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY REPAIR SPONTANEOUS OR EXOGENOUSLY INDUCED DAMAGES OF ITS GENETIC MATERIAL. GENETIC STUDIES OF MICRO-ORGANISMS AND HUMAN CELL CULTURES HAVE SHOWN THAT THESE PATTERNS OF REPAIR MAY BE INHIBITED BY A TREATMENT WITH CERTAIN CHEMICAL COMPOUNDS. FROM THIS MAY RESULT A TREMENDOUS SENSITEVITY OF THE CELL TO A DOSE OF RADIATION WHICH IS WITHOUT, OR WITHOUT RECOGNIZABLE, EFFECTS ON A NORMAL CELL. AN INHIBITION OF REPAIR PROCESSES INDUCED BY THESE MEANS IN HUMAN SKIN CELLS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO RESULT IN SEVERE DAMAGE CAUSED ALREADY BY SMALL AMOUNTS OF SUN-LIGHT.

3. AS A RESULT OF RECENT RESEARCH IN CHEMICAL MUTAGENESIS, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CHEMICAL STRUCTURE OF MUTAGENS AND THEIR EFFICIENCY, CHEMICAL MUTAGENS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED, THE MUTAGENIC EFFICIENCY OF WHICH IS EXTRAORDINARILY HIGH. IN ADDITION, IT HAS BEEN FOUND THAT THE MAJORITY OF THESE NEW HIGHLY REACTIVE MUTAGENS ACT AT THE SAME TIME AS CARCINOGENS. BESIDES ACUTE POISONING, THEIR POTENTIAL MILITARY USE IS EXPECTED TO RESULT IN DELAYED SOMATIC AND GENETIC DAMAGES.

THE THREE EXAMPLES I QUOTED ILLUSTRATE THAT GENETIC
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FINDINGS MAY, IN FACT, GIVE RISE TO THE EMERGENCE OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

END TEXT.

THEN, AFTER SOME CITATIONS OF SOVIET MDW PAPERS, THE PAPER GOES ON TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

POSSIBLE GENETIC WEAPONS WOULD BE BASED ON NEW

BIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF ACTION NOT COVERED BY THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF BACTERIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS, AND WHICH, ON THE WHOLE, REPRESENT SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY AND MOLECULAR AND CELL GENETICS. WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER TO A DEFINITION OF THE MODES OF ACTION AS "VARIETIES OF PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL IMPACTS" SHOULD BE ADDED A MENTION OF "THEIR RESPECTIVE COMBINATIONS." IT IS TO FORESEE THAT IN FUTURE A COMBINATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL OR PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF ACTION MIGHT PRODUCE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS EFFECTS.

END TEXT.

THEN, AFTER MORE CITATIONS FROM THE SOVIET MDW PAPER, THE PAPER INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

EXPECIALLY DANGEROUS EFFECTS MAY BE PRODUCED BY A COMBINATION OF GENETIC AND SO-CALLED ETHNIC WEAPONS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF GENETICALLY DETERMINED SENSITIVITY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS BASED ON ENZYME POLYMORPHISMS TO OBTAIN SELECTIVE EFFECTS ON USERS AND AFFECTED PERSONS.

END TEXT.

11. INFORMAL MEETING AUG 10. USSR DELEGATION INTRODUCED PAPER CCD/514 (10 AUGUST 1976) ENTITLED "ON DEFINITIONS OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND CONFIDENTIAL

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NEW SYSTEMS OF SUCH SEAPONS" (SEE AIRGRAM 205). THIS PAPER INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SHALL INCLUDE TYPES OF WEAPONS WHICH ARE BASED ON QUALITATIVELY NEW PRINCIPLES OF ACTION AND WHOSE EFFECTIVENESS MAY BE COMPARABLE WITH OR SURPASS THAT OF TRADITIONAL TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

END TEXT.

THE ANNEX TO THIS PAPER INCLUDES, UNDER THE HEADING "EXAMPLES OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION," THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

ETHNIC WEAPONS USING VARIOUS AGENTS FOR THE SELECTIVE EXTERMINATION OF SPECIFIC ETHNIC POPULATION GROUPS ARE A NEW TYPE OF WEAPON INsofar AS THEY PRODUCE A NEW TYPE OF EFFECT (SELECTIVE EXTERMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL ETHNIC GROUPS), THOUGH THE TARGET AND MEANS OF PRODUCING THE EFFECTS MAY BE TRADITIONAL.

END TEXT.

12. INFORMAL MEETING AUG 10. EXPERT FROM SWEDEN (DR. LUNDIN) MADE PREPARED STATEMENT (SEE AIRGRAM 207) WHICH INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

FIRST NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE ALREADY CONSIDERED AS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. NEW DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THESE AREAS THUS WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS QUALITATIVELY NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THIS MEANS THAT CERTAIN EXAMPLES MENTIONED CONCERNING POSSIBLE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS, SUCH AS FOR EXAMPLE SUPERHEAVY ELEMENTS, GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CONFIDENTIAL

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CHEMICALS LIKE DISXINES, SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THEY WOULD IN OUR VIEW BE COVERED BY EXISTING TREATIES OR TREATIES UNDER DISCUSSION. WE WOULD LIKE, IN THIS CONNECTION, TO REMIND OF THE 21-POWER RESOLUTION IN THE UN 1969 (UNGA, RES. 2603A XXIV) OUTLINING DEFINITIONS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, WHICH GOT BROAD SUPPORT. AS IN THE REPORT OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THE SAME YEAR, CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE DEFINED AS THOSE WITH A DIRECT TOXIC EFFECT IN MAN, ANIMAL OR PLANT, THAT IS THE AGENT IS DIRECTLY INTERFERING WITH THE METABOLISM OF THE LIVING ORGANISM. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARE LIVING ORGANISMS OR INFECTIVE MATTER FROM THEM AND ARE FOR THEIR EFFECT DEPENDING ON MULTIPLICATION OF THE AGENT IN THE ORGANISM BEFORE THE EFFECTS CAN APPEAR. IT WOULD BE VALUABLE TO HEAR MORE VIEWS FROM OTHER EXPERTS ON THIS MATTER. IN THIS CONNECTION WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO POINT TO THE NEGOTIATIONS GOING ON REGARDING ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION. THE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THEIR DEFINITIONS AS WELL AS USE MADE THEM VERY SIMILAR TO NEW SYSTEMS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AS SUGGESTED BY THE SOVIET UNION IN THE CRITERIA GIVEN IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT PROPOSAL.

END TEXT

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SAJ-01 ERDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 NRC-05

ACDE-00 /122 W

----- 120029

O R 131845Z AUG 76

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1870

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 GENEVA 6536

DISTO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD, US, UR

SUBJ: CCD - SCOPE OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS

ON BW AND CW

13. INFORMAL MEETING AUGUST 10. EXPERT FROM FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (DR. FEIGL) MADE PREPARED STATE-
MENT (SEE AIRGRAM 208) WHICH INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.
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WE SHOULD NOT FORGET ALSO THAT A GREAT PART OF THE
EXAMPLES GIVEN TO US FALL UNDER THE SCOPE OF ARMS CONTROL
AGREEMENTS ALREADY IN EXISTENCE OR UNDER ACTIVE NEGOTIA-
TION.

AS FAR AS SOME OF THE EXAMPLES ARE CONCERNED A FEW
OBSERVATIONS MAY BE PERMITTED. OCCASIONALLY, THERE IS
MADE REFERENCE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF TOXINE-LIKE
CHEMICAL COMPONENTS AND PAIN-PRODUCING AGENTS (ERGO-
GENICS) WHICH SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE PROPOSAL ABOUT
NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS. IN MY VIEW, HOWEVER, A
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGREEMENT SHOULD COMPRISE THOSE AGENTS.
FURTHERMORE, IT IS NOT YET CLEAR FOR US WHETHER
THE SO-CALLED ETHNIC WEAPONS SHOULD FUNCTION ON A CHEMICAL
BASIS AND WHAT SUCH A WEAPON SYSTEM SHOULD LOOK LIKE.

END TEXT.

14. INFORMAL MEETING AUGUST 10. US EXPERT (BUCHHEIM)
MADE PREPARED STATEMENT (SEE AIRGRAM A-202) WHICH IN-
CLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

IT ALSO SEEMS APPROPRIATE TO TAKE NOTE OF THE FACT
THAT IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT
INTO FORCE TO IMPOSE LIMITATIONS ON ATOMIC EXPLOSIVE
WEAPONS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. FURTHER-
MORE, THE PROCESS OF SEARCHING FOR STRONGER LIMITATIONS
CONTINUES.

THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE
EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS APPLICABLE TO NUCLEAR,
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

ONE CRITERION THAT THE UNITED STATES BRINGS TO
THESE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS IS THAT THE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD
NOT, IN ANY WAY, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, SUGGEST DILUTION
OF THE INTEGRITY OR SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF EXISTING
TREATIES OR NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNED WITH SPECIFIC KINDS
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OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

DURING THE INFORMAL MEETING YESTERDAY, WE HEARD AN ASSERTION THAT CERTAIN AGENTS OF HOSTILE BIOLOGICAL ACTION WOULD NOT BE COVERED BY THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

THIS KIND OF GENERAL ASSERTION IS VERY DISTURBING.

ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON ARMS LIMITATION OR DISARMAMENT SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATE MODERNIZATION IN LIGHT OF NEW SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS OR OTHER NEW FACTS. HOWEVER, MY GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT STATEMENTS THAT APPEAR INCORRECTLY TO STRIKE AT THE SCOPE OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS. SUCH STATEMENTS COULD BE VERY HARMFUL TO THE GENERAL CAUSE OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, BY CASTING UNWARRANTED DOUBT ON THE SCOPE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ALREADY EXISTING AGREEMENTS.

END TEXT.

15. BILATERAL US/USSR MEETING AUGUST 11, REPORTED GENEVA 6483, WHEREIN PARAS 2 THROUGH 7 ARE RELEVANT.

16. INFORMAL MEETING AUGUST 11 REPORTED GENEVA 6494, WHEREIN PARAS 1, 2, 3, 4 AND 9 ARE RELEVANT. FURTHER DETAILS PROVIDED IN PARAS 17 THROUGH 19 BELOW.

17. INFORMAL MEETING AUGUST 11. EXPERT FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA (FRANEK) MADE A STATEMENT ON GENETIC ENGINEERING (G.E.) WHICH WAS AN ALABORATION (SEE GENEVA 6483 PARA 2) OF PRINTED NOTES DISTRIBUTED TO THE MEETING. HIS NOTES (SEE AIRGRAM A-209) INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

IT IS CLEAR THAT A PART OF THE PROBLEM IS COVERED BY THE BW TREATY - E.G., THE MISUSE OF ARTIFICIALLY CONFIDENTIAL

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PREPARED STRAINS OF BACTERIA, RESISTANT TO ANTIBIOTICS.

WHEN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WERE DISCUSSED, THEY WERE CONSIDERED ONE OF THE POTENTIAL FACTORS OF A MODERN WAR, A WEAPON WHICH CAN BE USED FOR SPECIFIC ATTACK/LONG-TERM WERE EVALUATED, BUT MORE OR LESS AS SIDE-EFFECTS ONLY. G.E. CREATES A NEW POSSIBILITY OF LONG-

LASTING INFLUENCING THE WHOLE POPULATION OF A CONTINENT.
IT SEEMS TO US, THAT THE PROBLEM IS GETTING QUALITATIVELY
NEW DIMENSIONS.

END TEXT.

THEN, AFTER SOME MORE SCIENTIFIC-SOUNDING LANGUAGE,
FRANEK'S PRINTED NOTES INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

WE FEEL, THEREFORE, THAT G.E. OPENS WIDER POSSIBILI-
TIES OF MISUSE, THAN THOSE CONSIDERED IN COURSE OF
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PROHIBITION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

ENT TEXT.

18. INFORMAL MEETING AUGUST 11. AMBASSADOR VAN DER
KLAUW, THE NETHERLANDS, MADE A PREPARED STATEMENT (SEE
AIRGRAM A-210) WHICH INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

BDGIN TEXT.

ANOTHER PROBLEM WE HAVE, WHICH WAS ALSO MENTIONED
BY MY BRITISH COLLEAGUE, IS THE FACT THAT AT THE MOMENT
WE DO NOT SEE A PARTICULAR CATEGORY OF POSSIBLE NEW
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. PRACTICALLY ALL EXAMPLES
GIVEN UNTIL NOW ARE EITHER ALREADY COVERED BY EXISTING
TREATIES OR ARE THE SUBJECT OF ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS.
IN THIS CONNECTION I WISH TO REFER ALSO TO THE STATE-
MENT MADE BY THE DISTINGUISHED EXPERT OF THE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. I WILL BE THE LAST TO SAY THAT
GENETIC ENGINEERING COULD NOT BE VERY, VERY DANGEROUS.
I STRONGLY REJECT, HOWEVER, THE NOTION THAT GENETIC
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ENGINEERING FOR MILITARY PURPOSES IS NOT YET PROHIBITED
BY THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON CONVENTION. I THINK IT IS
VERY DANGEROUS TO STATE THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE NOT
YET PROHIBITED. (NOTE: AT THIS POINT VAN DER KLAUW
ADDED AN EXTEMPORANEOUS REMARK OBJECTING TO SIMILAR
STATEMENTS BY THE EXPERT FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA). IF
THERE IS ANY SHADE OF DOUBT ABOUT THAT, I WOULD LIKE
TO HAVE A THOROUGH DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT IN THE CCD.

END TEXT.

19. INFORMAL MEETING AUGUST 11. EXPERT FROM GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (DR. BOEHME) MADE A PREPARED STATE-
MENT (SEE AIRGRAM A-211) WHICH INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

ONE OF THE PROBLEMS, WHICH WERE RAISED DURING OUR DISCUSSIONS AT SEVERAL INSTANCES, WAS THE QUESTION WHETHER FINDINGS OF MODERN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY, ESPECIALLY THAT OF THE SO-CALLED GENETIC ENGINEERING, MAY BE USED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. WHILE ACADEMICIAN FOKIN AND MYSELF CONSIDERED SUCH A POSSIBILITY, SOME OF OUR DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUES DENIED THIS QUESTION, OR RATHER BELIEV THAT THIS ISSUE IS REGULATED UNDER ALREADY EXISTING TREATIES OR CONVENTIONS.

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 AF-08 ARA-06 CIAE-00

DODE-00 EA-07 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10

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ACDE-00 /122 W

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O R 131845Z AUG 76

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1871

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

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AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 GENEVA 6536

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TAGS: PARM, CCD, US, UR

SUBJ: CCD - SCOPE OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS
ON BW AND CW

ALLOW ME TO EXPRESS BRIEFLY MY POINT OF VIEW OF
THIS SPECIFIC QUESTION IN ORDER TO AVOID THAT THE DIFFER-
ENCES IN OPINION APPEAR BIGGER THAN THEY ARE IN REALITY.

STARTING FROM THE ASHBY-REPORT AND THE GUIDELINES
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AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WORK IN THE FIELD OF RECOMBINANT
DNA MOLECULES PREPARED BY THE NIH, DR. STRANGE FROM THE
DELEGATION OF THE UK DESCRIBED IN GREAT DETAIL THE
POTENTIAL USEFUL APPLICATIONS AS WELL AS THE POTENTIAL
BIOHAZARDS OF THE MENTIONED NEW TECHNIQUES. HE CONCLUDED
THAT THE USE OF GENETICALLY MANIPULATED BACTERIA OR OTHER
MICRO-ORGANISMS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS IS
ALREADY PROHIBITED BY THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION. ON THIS POINT WE COMPLETELY AGREE: THE
PREVENTION OF A MILITARY APPLICATION REQUIRES NOTHING MORE
THAN A STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THIS CONVENTION BY ALL
STATES.

WHEN YOU REMEMBER THE EXAMPLES I QUOTED IN MY TALK,
YOU WILL NOTE THAT I ONLY REFERRED TO THOSE CASES IN
WHICH NO ORGANISMS EXISTING IN NATURE ARE USED AS
PRINCIPLES OF ACTION FOR WEAPONS, BUT SYNTHETICALLY PRO-
DUCED, ARTIFICIAL VIRUSES OR VIROIDS, OR SYNTHETICALLY
PRODUCED, INFECTUOUS DNA MOLECULES RESPECTIVELY. IN
ORDER TO SHOW THAT THIS IS NOT A MATTER OF IMAGINATION
OR SCIENCE FICTION BUT SERIOUS REALITY, ALLOW ME,
MR. CHAIRMAN, TO QUOTE TWO SENTENCES FROM A SCIENTIFIC
DOCUMENT. IT IS THE "STATEMENT OF THE ASILOMAR
CONFERENCE ON RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES" PUBLISHED IN
ONE OF THE MOST PROMINENT SCIENTIFIC JOURNALS, "PROCEED-
INGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA", I QUOTE: "THE RECOMBINANT DNA
MOLECULES THEMSELVES AS DISTINCT FROM CELLS CARRYING
THEM MAY BE INFECTUOUS TO BACTERIA OR HIGHER ORGANISMS.
DNA PREPARATIONS FROM THESE EXPERIMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN
LARGE QUANTITIES, SHOULD BE CHEMICALLY INACTIVATED
BEFORE DISPOSAL." (VOL. 72, P. 1982 (1975). IT IS
INDEED DIFFICULT TO QUALIFY SUCH INFECTUOUS, ARTIFICIALLY
PRODUCED VIRUSES OR NAKED DNA-MOLECULES AS "BIOLOGICAL
AGENTS" IN THE SENSE OF THE BW CONVENTION. WE FEEL THAT

A SCIENTIFIC DISCUSSION ON THESE NEW POSSIBILITIES,
WHICH DID NOT YET EXIST IN 1971, IS NOT QUITE SO OUT
OF THE WAY AS OUTLINED BY MR. BUCHHEIM YESTERDAY.

END TEXT.

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20. INFORMAL MEETING AUGUST 12 REPORTED GENEVA 6513,
WHEREIN PARAS 1, 3 AND 7 ARE RELEVANT.

21. INFORMAL MEETING AUGUST 12. BUCHHEIM MADE
PREPARED STATEMENT (SEE GENEVA 6524 AND AIRGRAM A-204)
WHICH INCLUDED FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO HOLD THE VIEW THAT
THESE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD NOT IN ANY WAY,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, CAST UNWARRANTED DOUBT ON THE
INTEGRITY OR SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF EXISTING ARMS LIM-
ITATION AGREEMENTS OR NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION,
WE TOOK PARTICULAR NOTE OF THE STATEMENT ON AUGUST 11
OF THE EXPERT FROM THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC CLA-
RIFYING HIS VIEWS OF THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION. WE SHALL HAVE FURTHER
COMMENTS TO MAKE ON THIS SUBJECT.

END TEXT.

2. BILATERAL US/USSR MEETING AUGUST 12 REPORTED
GENEVA 6514, WHEREIN PARAS 2, 3 AND 4 ARE RELEVANT.

23. UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE, DELEGATION PLANS
ARE FOR AMBASSADOR MARTIN TO ADDRESS THE CCD PLENARY
ON TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, AND TO INCLUDE IN THIS STATE-
MENT AN EXPLICIT PORTION ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING
FROM DOUBT THE SCOPE AND FORCE OF EXISTING AND PROS-
PECTIVE AGREEMENTS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION. (CCD WESTERN GROUP
WAS INFORMED OF THESE PLANS AT AUGUST 13 MEETING.)
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, NEGOTIATIONS, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, CHEMICAL WARFARE WEAPONS
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Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 AUG 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
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Disposition Authority: BoyleJA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
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